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doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2011.12.015With its uniquely long historical series of ofﬁcially collected data
on occupational mortality, researchers in the UK have been well
placed to investigate the causes of health inequality. Since 1921, the
decennial Census of England and Wales has contained an “Occu-
pational Mortality Supplement” that tabulates mortality according
to groups of occupations, which came to be known as “social
classes”. After 1931 the class groups were sufﬁciently comparable
to allow trends to be discerned. The Black Report of 1980 (DHSS,
1980; Townsend, Davidson, & Whitehead, 1988), which put health
inequality onto the agenda of research and policy for the next 30
years, was based on these ofﬁcial statistics. The ofﬁcial measure of
social class used in the Report was not ideal as a measure of social
inequality, as it was never clear exactly what it operationalized. In
some census volumes it was described as a measure of ‘occupa-
tional skill’ and in others as ‘general standing in the community’. No
attempts were ever made to validate either of these deﬁnitions.
This may be one of the reasons why the ofﬁcial statistics, so inﬂu-
ential in their description of health inequality, were less helpful
when it came to understanding why it occurs.
The Decennial Supplements on OccupationalMortality show the
relentless increase of inequality in mortality, which if anything
accelerated after the introduction of the UK’s National Health
Service in 1946 and the implementation of the raft of policies
known as the “Welfare State”. During this period, ‘full employment’
was an objective of government policy (for men only), as were the
abolition of the other Five Great Evils of Squalor, Disease, Ignorance
and Want. In pursuit of these aims, post war governments of both
political colours built new housing and improved schooling as well
as maintaining free health care and beneﬁts for the unemployed.All rights reserved.The increase in inequality depicted in Fig. 1 took place against
a background of steady falls in mortality at the population level
(shown in Fig. 2). If the mortality rate for men and women in 1950
is thought of as 100, then the death rate fell between 1936 and 1995
from 40% above the 1950 level to 30% below. This “standardised
mortality ratio” in Fig. 2 takes account of the fact that during this
period, the overall population grew considerably older.
It is interesting to place these trends against the economic
background of the period. GDP and average earnings were rising, as
shown in Fig. 3
Income inequality fell somewhat in the post-2nd World War
period before increasing sharply from the 1970s (Lindert, 1998).
Average wealth indicators do not, however, show how relatively
lower wages cluster with occupational hazards, job insecurity and
unemployment across the life course. Those who are most likely to
need to save for periods without employment are the least likely to
have sufﬁcient income to allow them to do so. The same may be
said for the risk of needing to leave work at an early age due to
industrial accidents or disease; those who do so are the least likely
to have beneﬁted from generous occupational pension provision
whilst in work.
The social policy authority Richard Titmuss coined the terms
“occupational welfare” and “ﬁscal welfare” in the 1950s to refer to
arrangements such as expenses allowances and tax rebates on
pensions and mortgages which only beneﬁted the middle classes.
On top of these beneﬁts, it was already evident to Titmuss in the
early days of theWelfare State that equal access to services does not
guarantee equal treatment, so that universal services such as health
care and education also in effect yielded greater beneﬁts to middle
class patients and parents.
Even if the data on earnings in Fig. 3 could be taken at face value,
a healthy life does not just depend on income. It depends on income
in relation to needs. In 1997 Morris calculated the cost of a healthy
Fig. 1. increase in the mortality gap between social classes in England and Wales from
1931 to 1991: Standardised. (Sources: Based on Wilkinson, 1986 table 1.1; Drever,
Bunting, & Harding, 1997 table 8.2).
Fig. 3. Trends in Gross domestic Product and average earnings, UK, 1940e1990.
Source: Based on : L Craig. A century of labour market change: 1900 to 2000. Labour
market trends March 2003: 133e144.
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(Morris, Donkin, Wonderling, Wilkinson, & Dowler, 2000 e see
below).
The total was about the same as the UK MinimumWage but far
more than beneﬁt level at the time of the research. What is notable
is that ‘biological necessities’ (food, heat) make up only the
minority of the costs. There is a high cost associated with social
participation. This included things like having new clothes rather
than second hand, soap, toothpaste and shampoo, a daily news-
paper and money for one outing to the cinema or public house per
week with friends. All these were judged necessary for the indi-
vidual tomaintainmembership of a social group. Lack of such social
support is known to be as hazardous to health as many forms of
risky behaviour (Berkman & Syme, 1979; Holt-Lunstad, Smith, &
Layton Bradley, 2010). The highest cost, however, was to pay
for somewhere to live. Whereas the cost of social participation
depends on the norms and values in a society (e.g. a certain level of
cleanliness and awareness of what is going on in the world, and the
ability to reciprocate the generosity of others), the cost of lodging
depends on wider political and economic forces.
I would argue that what we are seeing, both in the time trends
presented here and in differences in health inequality between
nations, is the result of cultural and political forces as much as
changes in income and wealth per se. In some communities and
nations more than others, social support and acceptance depend
more on factors that require money purchases (i.e. which are
commodiﬁed). Similarly, in some political and economic settings,Fig. 2. Mortality 1950e1995 men and women. Standardised to take account of pop-
ulation ageing. Source: Based on data from: Ofﬁce for national statistics: Mortality
statistics general. Series DH1 no. 33 (London: ONS, 2002) Accessed at: http://www.
statistics.gov.uk/downloads/theme_health/DH1_33_revised_14Nov03/DH1_33_
revised_14Nov03.pdf, 18 may 2011.the cost of lodging is subsidised and therefore requires a far lower
proportion of the income of those on a relatively low wage, than in
others. Amartya Sen’s concept of “capability” offers insight into
ways of explaining differences in health inequality. The concept of
capability leads us to understand that the affordability of biological
necessities depends on the costs of social participation. As Sen
(1992:115) puts it:
“Relative deprivation in the space of incomes can yield absolute
deprivation in the space of capabilities. In a country that is
generally rich, more income may be needed to buy enough
commodities to achieve the same social functioning, such as
‘appearing in public without shame’. The same applies to the
capability of ‘taking part in the life of the community’”.
People do not pay for biological needs ﬁrst at the expense of
social participation, so the costs of social participation effect how
much money is left for ‘basic needs’. If income is rising, but at the
same time social participation and acceptance are increasingly
dependent on spending money, the overall result will be that there
is less money to support the costs of a healthy life. Income will not
buy the same amount of good health in all societies.
The health disadvantage of a relatively low income can, there-
fore, be understood in terms of how much is left to be spent on the
material components of a healthy life once the costs of social
integration are covered. If this is the case, we would expect to see
less health inequality at times and places where social participation
and housing are less of a ﬁnancial burden on the individual. This
may come about because of differences in cultural norms regarding
“fraternity” and social solidarity, perhaps combined with policy
provision for housing lower income citizens. Policies give signals as
to the relative importance of social solidarity versus wealth and
status. A high level of taxation, for example, would signal the lower
importance of wealth in itself, and could of course also result in
resources being shifted from individual luxury consumption
towards the provision of low cost, high standard housing. Such
a policy could incidentally also lower the cost of at least one of the
‘biological’ necessities, namely domestic heating costs.
Conclusion
The evidence on trends in health inequality in the UK and its
constituent countries, set against that on income trends shows the
importance of psychosocial and cultural factors. Considerable
increases in overall national prosperity and individual earnings
were accompanied by large increases in social class mortality
differentials. The search for understanding of health inequality
needs to pay far more attention to wider social factors such as the
tax and welfare systems, the values that are embedded in economic
and political institutions.
M. Bartley / Social Science & Medicine 74 (2012) 658e660660Acknowledgements
This work was funded by ESRC Centre Grant RES-596-28-0001
International Centre for Life Course Studies in Society and Health.
References
Berkman, L. F., & Syme, S. L. (1979). Social networks, host resistance, and mortality:
a nine-year follow-up study of Alameda county residents. American Journal of
Epidemiology, 109(2), 186e204.
DHSS. (1980). inequalities in health: Report of a research working group. Department
of Health and Social Services.Drever, F., Bunting, J., & Harding, S. (1997). Male mortality from major causes of
death. In F. Drever, & M. Whitehead (Eds.), Health inequalities. London:
HMSO.
Holt-Lunstad, J., Smith, T. B., & Layton Bradley, J. (2010). Social relationships and
mortality risk: a meta-analytic review. Public Library of Science Medicine, 7(7),
e1000316101371/journalpmed1000316.
Lindert, P. H. (1998). Three centuries of inequality in Britain and America. University of
California Davis Dept of Economics. WP #97-09.
Morris, J. N., Donkin, A. J. M., Wonderling, D., Wilkinson, P., & Dowler, E. A. (2000).
A minimum income for healthy living. Journal of Epidemiology and Community
Health, 54, 885e889.
Sen, A. (1992). Inequality reexamined. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Townsend, P., Davidson, N., & Whitehead, M. (1988). Inequalities in health: The black
report and the health divide. London: Penguin.
